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9Abstract
In this article we combine two traditions within political science: regional party research and self-
government research. The reason behind this rationale is to show that mobilization of the electorate is solely 
in the hands of regional parties in the three autonomous islands under investigation: the Faroe Islands, 
Greenland and the Åland Islands. We use most similar systems design as an approach to look at how the 
different party systems have evolved over time. The degree of entrenched self-rule has been different over 
time but is now on a similar level. The background variables that have been held constant in this context are 
the population size and the degree of a distinct culture and language, which emanates from a homogenous 
population on the islands. A distinct party system can evolve exclusively around a national parliament and 
an entrenched regional assembly. In our study regional parties are members of both. Self-government has 
a severe impact on the birth of regional parties, and their incumbents serve in the first instance as agents 
for the regional government in national parliaments. In this study we have chosen to look at the impact of 
entrenched self-government on regional parties and regional party systems. Self-government facilitates 
birth of new parties, and when the devolved government is well consolidated it gives fuel to the emergence 
of a distinct full-scale party system.
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1. Introduction
Generally, regional and national parties compete for seats in the regional parliaments, 
which is the case in Catalonia and Scotland for instance. However, the mobilization of the 
electorate in the Nordic autonomies is solely in the hands of regional parties who are late-
comers in these ethnically homogenous self-ruled territories. The aim of this paper is to 
explain how a limited numerical representation in national parliaments is connected by 
the institutional link to the entrenched regional self-government, making regional parties 
agents of their regional government. Regional parties with no back-up from territories 
with de jure self-government lack a distinct party system (like national systems) and are 
exposed to political challenges and uncertainty of a different mode. In our three regional 
cases they would have almost no political power in the national parliament to protect their 
cultural and territorial diversity. Votes count, and their small number would be totally 
overrun by the nation state votes and incumbents. Unfortunately, this is missing in the 
literature on regional parties, which we here try to discover and make understandable with 
our three cases. Therefore, this paper is organized to include a more extensive theoretical 
discussion followed by empirical evidence. In this paper two traditions meet: regional 
party research and self-government research. There is not much communication between 
these two traditions. Not a single definition of “self-government” can avoid considerable 
criticism. Nevertheless, we argue that definitions which underscore self-government 
with entrenched power to legislate best fit our cases compared to other alternatives. It 
is easier to find an agreement of what is considered small. Small refers to population 
size and homogeneous to a similar language and culture. Thus, this paper gives proof of 
how autonomous governments with considerable legal power, support growth of regional 
parties and party systems in the Nordic autonomies. 
Ethnicity is said to be both broader and narrower than nationalism. Michael Keating 
shows that stateless movements have de-ethnicized in those cases he analysed, but in some 
other cases ethnic politics is evident (Keating, 2008: 160–171). Our cases include three 
insular territories with small populations and with strong national symbols where ethnicity 
is a given part of the shared nationalism. Only in the case of the Åland Islands is ethnicity 
much broader, as it is the language spoken in neighbouring Sweden, as well as partly in 
Finland. Greenlandic is linked to familiar languages in Canada, Russia and Alaska, and 
Faroese is solely spoken in the Faroe Islands. 
An important factor in the long-run for the development and quality of self-governed 
territories is well-established regional parties. Recent research in relation to regionalism 
and nationalism shows that this type of party family is more heterogeneous than other 
party families on the traditional left-right spectrum. Many regionalist parties compete at 
more than one level in a multi-level state system – local, regional, metropolitan state and the 
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European Union (EU) levels – trying to press their views for better political management 
of their territory (Sorens, 2008; Massetti, 2009). Still, almost all studies are focused on 
regional parties in national state-wide elections, and much less on parties and elections to 
regional assemblies. In addition, we argue that it makes fundamental difference whether 
regional parties act in entrenched self-governed territories or not. 
Another distinction within this party family is the cleavage between regionalist 
('autonomist') and secessionist ('separatist') parties. While the autonomy parties' goal is 
a deepening and/or enlargement of the region's own policy within an existing statehood 
arrangement, the secessionist parties' objective is to break away from the current statehood 
context and create a new politically sovereign territorial state. There is also a third category 
of parties, which can be called irredentist parties. Irredentist movements seek to re-draw 
existing borders in order to transfer their region's statehood to a neighbouring kin-state with 
a language and culture more in line with their own identity (Ackrén and Lindström, 2012).
However, we argue that the role of regional parties in regional elections/government 
and in state-wide elections/government is affected mainly by the degree of autonomy and 
supported by population size and ethnic homogeneity in the region. A devolved government 
with its own power to legislate supports the birth and life of regional parties and the 
creation of a distinct party system. Furthermore, the discussion is blurred by diverging 
definitions of self-ruled territories. To make arguments clear we have chosen three small 
and homogeneous self-ruled territories with a high degree of entrenched autonomy 
(Ackrén, 2009). The Faroe Islands, Greenland, and the Åland Islands fulfil the criteria 
of small population size, a distinct ethnic homogeneity, and devolved legislative power 
implemented under different time periods. They fulfil the criterion for a most similar 
systems design where the different timings of full regional power of government give fuel 
to create a separate party system with parties of their own. In addition, it is only on these 
islands that regional parties can be found in the Nordic countries. 
2. Parties in self-ruled arrangements
If there is or has been a disagreement of the definition and categorisation of arrangements 
between self-ruled territories and the core state, the situation is not better when we turn 
to regional parties. It seems like there is a lack of synchronicity between the theory 
development of self-ruled territories and party research focused on regional parties, on the 
one hand, and ethnic/regional mobilization on the other. Regional parties are sprung out 
from a centre and periphery cleavage where an ethnic group share a common subnational 
territorial border and an exclusive group identity. These parties are even called ethno-
regionalist parties because they not only serve ethnic group interest but also regional 
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interests (Türsan, 1998: 4–6). Dandoy (2010) for example classifies ethno-regionalist 
parties in three overall categories: protectionist, decentralist and secessionist parties. 
The first category of protectionist parties addresses concerns related to recognition 
of linguistic, religious or cultural identity without challenging the state structure. The 
decentralist parties can also be labelled autonomist parties, since these parties demand 
enlargement of the region's own policy within an existing state, something which might 
lead to a reordering of the state structure, its institutions and its internal borders. The 
last category with secessionist parties demands separation from the state or outright 
independence (Dandoy, 2010: 205–206). The aims of ethnic mobilization in peripheral 
territories have been described in a simple way as: “to live in one’s country, to speak one’s 
own language, and to be autonomous” (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 140). Rokkan and Urwin 
underscore that increased devolvement is not the only aim; depending on circumstances, 
secession might be an option, as well as a demand for a larger share of state resources. 
As we can see, regional parties live and act in different institutional and territorial 
contexts. In relation to party research, it makes analytical sense to categorize parties, and 
therefore regional parties are lumped together without putting much effort into whether 
they emerged in small or larger regions, or if the region is a de facto or a de jure self-ruled 
territory. This approach makes sense if a regional party competes in a constituency with 
other national parties or not, or if regional parties are competing in regional elections only, 
or if regional parties can compete both in regional and national elections or not. The latter 
option has been emphasized by Charlie Jeffery, who asserts that these parties have to 
adapt and differentiate how they present themselves simultaneously to different electorates 
(Jeffery, 2009: 639–650). Eve Hepburn asserts that such parties have moved from “niche” 
actors in party systems to mainstream political players. Many regional parties are no 
longer players in the periphery, they have entered government at regional and/or state level, 
forcing other parties to respond to their demands, and implementing their policy proposals 
(Hepburn, 2009: 477–499). The success of regional parties is that they have moved from 
protest to power and are now typical mainstream parties. Several current studies have 
put effort into positioning regional parties according to their altering political preferences 
on different electoral scenes, which may challenge their credibility (Däubler, Müller & 
Stecker 2018, 541–564; Alonso, Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber 2015, 839–850; Cabeza & Cómes 
2015, 851–865; Alonso, Gómes & Cabeza 2013, 189–211).
Both Hepburn and Jeffery, among others, name these regional parties stateless nationalist 
and regionalist parties (SNRPs). 'Stateless' is used to characterize regionalist parties 
which operate in nations or regions that do not enjoy full statehood, i.e., they operate on a 
subnational level in contrast to national parties which operate on the state level. In a note to 
Hepburn’s article, countries are listed where SNRPs are established. SNRPs include a mix 
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of federal states and unitary states, such as Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Finland and Portugal, according to Hepburn (Hepburn, 2009). No attention is given to the 
Faroe Islands and Greenland. After defining regionalist parties, Emanuele Massetti claims 
that factors such as (1) the level of self-government, (2) whether the regionalist party enjoys 
a mild autonomy or exists in an outright secession situation, or (3) if the territory is a region 
or part of a different nation-state, simply do not matter when regionalist parties are defined 
and classified (Massetti, 2009: 503). 
However, instead of giving the degree of self-government a passive role in understanding 
and explaining regional parties, it should be used as an independent variable. To be sure, it 
will not make any sense for the definition, but it has severe implications for how regional 
parties act. Institutional arrangements matter as it defines under what conditions regional 
parties have to accommodate. Different independent variables are used such as socio-
economic, centre-periphery or ideological dimensions in regional party research. In 
addition, institutional variables such as type of government, electoral systems and laws 
regulating party life are common in party research. Regional parties acting within the 
framework of self-government have an advantage compared to regional parties with no 
territorial autonomy. New parties are said to be mortal organizations, although they seldom 
totally disappear (Pedersen 1982, 1–16; 1991, 95–114). They have to pass thresholds which 
are related to the cost of registration, access to public funding, benefits from electoral 
office, and the probability of getting elected (Tavits 2006, 99–119). New regional parties 
lacking a territorial self-government are facing multiple costs to cross barriers and rules 
set up by the dominant cartel of national parties in government (Katz and Mair 2018, 125–
150). In a self-government context all thresholds are lower and easier to reach, as national 
electoral rules are not in force. Rules are set up by territorial governments without any 
legal interference from the core state government. 
In lack of a common view on how self-government is defined and understood the 
concept has to be problematized and cannot solely rely on party research. Charles Jeffery 
is aware of the problem when he states that party competition is still focused on parties 
that compete for state-wide office in state-wide parliaments, and not on parties competing 
for office in regional elections. The way from protest to power through ethno-territorial 
and socio-economic mobilization is more about winning regional government office than 
anything else on the state or EU level of government (Jeffery, 2009: 639–650). Studies 
show that political decentralization gives strength to regional parties by giving them a real 
chance of governing at the regional level (Brancati, 2008: 135–159). Decentralization is 
here understood as entrenched self-rule with legislative power. A study in federal Belgium 
shows, not surprisingly, that sub-state governments are more responsive to their sub-state 
voters than the federal governments (van Haute & Deschouwer 2018, 683–702). In small 
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homogenous self-governed regions, the gap between voters and those elected tends to be 
multiplied.
It is not uncommon that territorial arrangements in federal and unitary states are mixed 
without hesitation, and without considering what role these parties have in different 
institutional and cultural contexts. Therefore, we must separate types of party systems from 
other individual parties and their political aims. First, it makes sense to consider if parties 
act in an environment of self-ruled government or not. A second important distinction 
is between ethnically homogenous territories – where the non-core state is territorially 
defined as having a sole official language or is overwhelmingly dominant – and regions 
where the core state language is dominant and has an official status. A third important 
factor is whether nations have a mixed ethnic composition – that is, a mix of language(s)/
culture(s) throughout the entire state. If they do, this makes possible what Giovanni Sartori 
calls a polarized party system of pluralism with ideological distance (Sartori, 2005: 116–
154; Mair, 1996: 83–106). Party systems in federations are nationalised but give space to 
regional parties in state/province government elections, especially where ethno-federalism 
prevails. Regional parties in Quebec and Catalonia are well known examples of ethno-
federalism. This depends, of course, on the extent to which votes are translated into seats 
in proportional systems (Sartori, 1997: 7–10). 
The parties' role at the federal level is of less magnitude. In unitary states party systems 
are nationalised, giving restricted options to regional parties even where government 
functions are decentralised but not devolved. In all cases mentioned, regional parties in 
unitary states face the toughest cultural and institutional thresholds to overcome, facing 
the risks of taking costs of collective sacrifice of votes. 
3. Diverging concepts of self-rule
Self-rule as a concept is complicated to define, and it is even harder to find any common 
ground in the literature about what it really contains. Here we will outline a short evaluation 
of different definitions before we come to terms with why autonomous self-government 
fits our cases in contrast to federal alternatives. The concept of “autonomy” is one of 
the most common but also one of the vaguest concepts for mapping self-ruled islands 
such as the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and the Åland Islands. “Autonomy” can cover 
features of different forms of organizations, institutions, local and regional government 
and entrenched self-ruled territories. Autonomy is related to territory, but also to culture 
in situations where minority rights are protected from the majority culture (Lapidoth, 
1997: 37–47). Territorial autonomy is sometimes labelled as asymmetric federalism when 
a region falls under a country-wide entrenchment but enjoys different authority. If a region 
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receives special treatment in constitutional and statutory law it may be called a special 
autonomous region (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel, 2010: 29–31). 
Those influenced by federalist thinking have made several classifications of federal 
arrangements, such as associated state arrangements and confederations. Asymmetry in 
federations is linked to difference, and this has been emphasized in many ways. Alfred 
Stepan has mapped asymmetry in two categories: monolithic federations like the US, 
Australia and Germany, and asymmetrical federations like the multinational Belgium, 
Canada and Spain (Stepan, 1999: 29–31). Multinational asymmetry seems to have inspired 
scholars to introduce ethno-federalism as a concept to be applied also on other types of 
arrangements (Hale, 2004: 165–193; Roeder, 2009: 203–219). In this case, however, diverse 
ethnicity is central in how different federal arrangements are classified. Daniel Elazar has 
used the concept of federacy to explain the asymmetrical relationship between a larger and 
a smaller power (Elazar, 1987: 7).
David Rezvani has brought new light to the scattered discussion about how to understand 
and categorize self-ruled territories. Above all, he makes a clear distinction between 
different federal arrangements and non-federal solutions designated partially independent 
territories (PIT). PITs are nationalistically distinct, constitutionally different territories 
that share and divide sovereign powers with a core state (Rezvani, 2014: 1–6; 93–97). They 
are not fully incorporated with the core state and are not member-units of federations or 
fully controlled parts of unitary states. The core state can be a federation, a decentralized 
union, or a unitary state.
From our perspective, we argue that PIT makes the distinction between what is an 
autonomous self-government and a federal arrangement more obvious. The self-ruled 
islands of the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and the Åland islands are by no means members 
of federations. Instead, they are separate territories with sovereign power to legislate and 
govern within realms of devolved entrenchment. The arrangement gives them veto rights 
if the core state intends to violate the rules of self-government. Decisions of that kind are 
based on bilateral agreements and legal acts. Moreover, the islands have a distinct national 
identity different from the nation state. The nation states and the self-governed islands are 
separate polities which are constitutionally unincorporated and have relative free hands to 
have control over foreign affairs. 
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4. Why small ethnically distinct islands?
Small states are mostly unitary states. (Exceptions can be found, such as some micro-
states in the Caribbean and South Pacific). In unitary states sovereignty is centralised, 
and public administration is often decentralised, which therefore can efficiently be run by 
the government. By nature, unitary states’ government decisions intend to follow similar 
paths around the country in a more comprehensive way than decentralised states with a 
federal arrangement. Ethnic diversity can be a challenge for all states, but especially for 
unitary states. There are different contexts where ethnic groups are living either scattered 
around in the country, as the First Nations in Canada, or where a group holds a territorial 
grip in a specific region, as do the French-speaking people in Wallonia in Belgium, for 
instance. Conflicts might occur where there are several ethnic groups living side by side 
in the same territory. How these groups are assimilated within the core state can then take 
various forms. 
Rezvani, for example, is concerned with how to implement clear distinctions between 
federal and other arrangements, because PITs include elements similar to federalism. He 
focuses on ethnic divisions between core states and PITs. An ethno-federal arrangement 
allows a territorial homeland for ethnic minorities, a territory which they control. Rezvani 
concludes that PIT arrangements are favourable both for the core states and the PITs, 
because they serve as solutions for some of the world’s most intractable nationalistic 
disputes. 
Roeder states that such arrangements are more common in non-federal states with 
devolved autonomy (Roeder, 2007: 43–46). In such cases, Liam Anderson argues that two 
alternatives are available to ethno-federalism: Unitarianism, whereby power is centralized 
and controlled by a majority group, or a federal arrangement in which the geographical 
distribution of ethnic groups is irrelevant. His conclusion is that most states have adopted 
ethno-federalism because other alternatives have been tried, and have failed (Anderson, 
2014: 165–204). In his view, more devolved power handled to homeland governments will 
enhance conflicts with the national identity that holds the common state together (Roeder, 
2009: 203–219).
Islands per se assert a certain identity due to their isolation and physical location in the 
periphery; islanders feel that they belong to the same community due to their insularity 
and natural boundaries given by their geography (Olausson, 2007: 26–31). Islands are more 
distinct territories compared to landlocked regions. Consequently, islands are significantly 
more often self-governed than landlocked territories. Added to this, the distinction becomes 
even sharper if the islands fulfil the criterion of ethnoregional in relation to the unitary state's 
dominant language and culture. Many islands naturally enjoy some degree of autonomy, 
especially if they are distant from their metropolitan power and have a distinct society and 
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culture anchored in what could be seen as sub-nationalism. This could be explained as a 
regional or geographically anchored ethnicity (Baldacchino, 2010: 103–104).
The nation-states of Denmark and Finland have similar population sizes of around 5.5 
million inhabitants, and a similar degree of ethnic homogeneity. Danish is the only official 
language in the core state Denmark. Finland is officially bilingual, with a small Swedish 
minority along the Southern and Western coasts. In practice, Finnish is the dominant 
language in the country. That is the explanation for why Swedish is entrenched in the 
constitution as the sole official language on the Åland Islands. In the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland, Faroese and Greenlandic are the official languages respectively, but Danish is 
used in communication with the core state. In terms of language and culture, these three 
small (in terms of population) islands stand in contrast to the homogenous and unitary core 
states of Denmark and Finland. The islanders constitute a Gemeinschaft national identity 
which is institutionalised and entrenched in a de jure self-rule. 
4.1 The feature of regional parties
Given the concept of the distinct self-government arrangement, where the self-ruled 
territory has legislative power, entrenched to an elected assembly and a government, can 
parties in these assemblies still be considered regional or not? The answer depends on the 
arena in which they seek seats. If the entire party system in the self-ruled territory is distinct 
and includes parties that have no intentions to compete in national elections, the answer is 
no. No core state level parties compete with them in assembly elections and the legislators 
act independently from the state. It could apply to our three cases of small homogeneous 
territories with distinct language and culture only if parties exclusively compete for office 
in regional assembly elections and not in core state elections. This criterion does not fit to 
our cases as all parties included are involved in core state elections. Nor can core states act 
totally independently; their hands are tied with international agreements and commitments 
concerning commerce, defence, border protection and traffic, to mention some examples, 
which is also the case for countries that are not members of the European Union.
However, if the self-ruled territory is given a seat(s) in the core state parliament the answer 
is yes, as far as regional parties actively seek and compete for office in national parliaments. 
The intention is more important to the definition than the outcome in terms of a seat in 
parliament. The elected legislators represent in the first instance their self-ruled territory, 
even though in practice they have to seek cooperation with a party close to their political 
aims. Parties in the European parliament follow a similar principle, they contest elections in 
member states with national party symbols, a national party organisation, and they represent 
their country in parliament as members of a chosen European parliament party closest to 
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their political aims. Thus, national parties in a supra-national context can be considered 
regional, depending of course on whether we accept realities and open our willingness to 
adjust the absolute sovereignty claim between core EU institutions and its member states. 
This is something highlighted recently where sovereignty in its traditional sense is claimed 
to have eroded. Rather, there are multiple sites of sovereign authorities and therefore the 
term post-sovereignty is on the way to becoming accepted (Keating, 2008: 162–163).
If a self-ruled region is culturally mixed and the core state language is dominant or at 
least official and commonly spoken the situation is different, as it usually is common in 
large heterogeneous regions. In Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia and Wales there are 
open doors for core state parties to compete with the regional parties in regional assembly 
elections. Supposing that parties still are hierarchical organizations, these parties from 
the core state could effectively compete in order to nationalize the self-ruled assembly 
elections and government. Even core state parties have to organize regionally/locally to 
nominate eligible candidates; no other way is possible. In addition, parties tend to take 
a stratarchical form in which different mutually autonomous levels coexist, including a 
minimum of authoritative control (Katz and Mair, 2002: 113–135). The regional branch can 
independently control policies, programmes and strategies without the consent of the core 
state party. In a self-governed arrangement, it is a question of loyalty if the party branch 
will separate totally from the core state party organization or pronounce its difference 
and devolve itself to an associated branch, or else stay formally integrated. In the first two 
cases elected MPs to the core state parliament are representatives of a regional interest. In 
contrast, the last case is not a regional party, whereas parties from the self-ruled region are 
to be considered regional parties represented in the core state parliament. But in the self-
governed legislative assembly all parties are formally equal, though dispersed loyalties can 
lead to scattered fractions of parties or independents. In fact, a high degree of autonomy 
facilitates birth of new regional parties and separations from national party organizations. 
Regional assemblies have the power to support regional parties with public subsidies, 
media attention, and legislative protection from external party pressures. 
Although parties in federations and unitary states can take stratarchical forms and adapt 
to regional culture, they are part of complex party organizations. Regional parties stay 
regional within a given territory, but in national parliaments or supra-national assemblies 
they share the regional party character with parties from self-ruled regions. To mix regional 
parties with parties in legislative self-ruled assemblies is not a feasible way to proceed. 
Studies show how complicated it can be when parties in self-ruled legislative assemblies 
are lumped together with regional parties in unitary states. To be sure, there can be some 
common elements such as magnitude, economic difference, cultural homogeneity, and 
distinct ethnicity. All these elements are important especially during a de facto phase 
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of regional mobilization and recognition, but subordinated when a given territory is 
entrenched in a PIT type arrangement. Protected sovereignty by constitution and/or by law 
within a given territory gives parties a central role in dealing with budget and legislation, 
like parties in core state parliaments. This is different from regional parties in federal and/
or unitary state parliaments, which are small bricks in a large federal or centralized unit. 
In addition, regional self-governments have free hands to legislate reforms to enlarge 
democracy and experiment with new forms of participation and government, provided it is 
not contrary to the constitution. Depending on the degree of autonomy, democracy can take 
different forms in the self-governed region compared to the core state. In administration it 
is a challenge to organize law-drafting and other administrative tasks properly where there 
is a lack of human and material resources. Regional parties are key actors in planning and 
implementing these reforms.
4.2 Who governs? The impact of regional size
Following the literature on regional parties, several observations have already been 
mentioned. However, there are some aspects of importance that are seldom noticed. In the 
arguments of de facto and de jure self-ruled regions these are mixed implicitly because 
it does not matter, due to the arguments already mentioned. In fact, this is something 
that seems to characterise regional party literature. If regional parties are in focus to be 
explained it works to a certain extent, but not in general. The variety of size in self-ruled 
territories is not fully understood and examined. Many studies put emphasis on escalating 
conflicts between self-ruled regions and the core state in countries such as Spain, Canada, 
and the UK (Keating and Wilson, 2009: 536–558; Heller, 2002: 657–685; Keating, 2008). 
Large self-ruled regions which demand more autonomy or even independence are of course 
of more interest for political scientists. Other studies have a wide comparative approach, 
searching for ideological constraints, cleavages, and national destabilization (Janda, 1989: 
349–370; Brancati, 2005: 143–159; Brancati, 2008: 135–159; Massetti and Schakel, 2015: 
866–886; Massetti and Schakel, 2016: 59–79). Regional parties have an essential role in 
these studies of increased decentralism.
Regional parties gain visibility when they act in national parliaments demanding 
extended autonomy, and even strive for independence. The profile and strategy of these 
parties, including their electoral strength, is essential in fulfilling their aims among 
national legislators. Self-ruled territories such as Scotland and Catalonia are due to their 
size well represented in the national assemblies in London and Madrid. In elections regional 
parties have to compete with national parties in their constituencies, of which some take 
a pro-regional stand, and in some cases the hegemony of the established party system has 
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been eroded by the strong influx of regional parties following regional or linguistic lines 
(Keating, 2013: 82–85; Scantamburlo, Alonso & Gómez 2018, 615–639). But what is the 
case if a self-ruled region is small and regional parties only have a minimal representation 
in the national assembly?
Not much is said about the role of parties in small partial independent territories. We 
know from studies made in micro-states that parties are not well organized and are not 
even necessary to run for the government (Wettenhall, 1992: 56–57; Kersell, 1992: 290–
293). Dag and Carsten Anckar found that democracy manages well without parties in their 
study of six micro-states. The lack of parties is explained by their extreme smallness, 
dispersed archipelagos, and cultural resistance (Anckar & Anckar, 2000: 225–247). A 
study from the micro-state Palau comes to a similar conclusion where size and culture 
contribute to the non-existence of parties (Veenendaal, 2016: 27–36). A lack of parties was 
also typical in our three cases during the formative years of self-government. Evidence 
which dates back to ancient Greece tells us that homogeneity only can be reached in small 
communities. Generalisations on small size communities include that members are more 
homogeneous, incentives to conform are strong, open opponents to the majority view are 
few, and conflicts among organizations are uncommon (Dahl & Tufte, 1973: 91–94). 
We are now ready to study three similar insular cases in the North which are small and 
homogeneous, with a high degree of self-rule which developed to full force under three 
different time periods. How did the empowerment of devolved self-government create 
distinct party systems and regional parties as agents of their regional governments? 
5. Parties and party systems in devolved regions
Denmark and Finland are highly integrated and politically assimilated. Attempts have 
been made to include the self-ruled regions of the Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland 
Islands into the national integration, as they were in the past. Core states protect their 
territorial borders and try to maintain a policy of compromise with their self-ruled regions 
and to settle open conflicts and avoid them drifting away from state control. The self-ruled 
insular regions have a national identity of their own, aiming to maximise their separate 
political and economic interests. This approach is inconsistent with the way a centralised 
unitary state works. Threats of secession with international inference faced the unitary 
states of Finland in 1921 and Denmark in 1944 and 1948 when they were forced to accept 
an arrangement of self-government (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 58–61). Greenland lived with its 
colonial past until 1953 but became integrated as a county before Greenland gained self-
rule in 1979 (Harhoff, 1993: 50–70; Lidegaard, 1991: 179–228). The process did not stop 
there, but the scope of politics changed to be institutionalised and regulated in law.
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From the very beginning politics was dominated with the relation to the core state, and 
it still is. Domestic issues in politics are important to parties but always subordinated to 
the self-rule status triggered by the core state or the region itself. In these homogeneous 
insular regions parties were not necessarily needed to defend their self-rule against 
the core state. More important was their regional government, which had the strongest 
mandate to negotiate with the core state government. Therefore, participation in national 
elections involving parties and voters does not have the same priority as elections to 
regional assemblies (see Appendix 1). Generally, voter turnout is higher in Denmark 
than in Finland, which tends to have a slight mobilising effect on the island electorate. 
Nevertheless, it is obviously clear that all three islands follow a similar pattern. National 
politics does not trigger islanders to the ballot box in the same manner as in the rest of 
Denmark and Finland. The difference is large, with some occasional exceptions when the 
difference is less than ten percent. Generally, the gap is 20 or more than 30 percent. Only 
once have the island voters been more active, which occurred on the Åland Islands in 1939, 
when the island was still integrated in the South West constituency and had to compete 
with the mainland electorate to win a mandate. The separation to an Åland constituency 
in 1948 calmed down the activity. In addition, separate island constituencies sorted out 
national party candidates from the election. National parties lost their grip on the island 
due to changes in electoral law. Comparing the three islands, it appears evident that voter 
turnout is generally higher in the Faroe Islands than in Greenland and on the Åland Islands. 
Geographical distance to the national mainland seems not to matter. 
Most parties are relatively new; all of them are small, and weakly organized. Figures 
show (Tables 2, 3, and 4) that devolved self-government facilitates birth of new regional 
parties and actors, and the birth of a complete party system when the regional government 
has consolidated itself to full legislative power. None of the core state parties have access 
or presence in regional elections or elections to the core state parliament. This is not 
uncommon in territories with national minorities or distinct language communities, as 
is the case in our study (Keating, 2013: 82–85). Thus, regional parties act and compete 
distinct from the much bigger core state parties during the electoral process. It makes 
sense when constituency borders and the island territorial borders fit (Sundberg, 2011: 
163–204). It gives more political fuel to emphasise distance from the nation state. How 
the elections are organised or how the islands are divided into small constituencies is of 
less importance. More important is the joint effect of constituency borders that fit with the 
regional legislative dominion. 
Thus, it is the content of both that makes sense for the birth of a party system including 
new regional parties. Regions without devolved self-government (de facto regions) can 
give birth to regional parties, but not party systems as in de jure regions which have 
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entrenched legislative power. Party systems can take different forms and numbers of 
parties. According to Giovanni Sartori, two conditions must be fulfilled if a party should 
be counted as a part of a party system. Firstly, the party has a coalition potential as the 
party must be needed, on at least some occasion, for a feasible coalition that can control 
government. Secondly, the party has a blackmail potential as the party’s existence affects 
the tactics of party competition of those parties that do have a coalition partner (Sartori 
2005, 107–110). Saying that, the criteria are fulfilled in our three cases, and, a distinct 
party system cannot appear in regions which lack entrenched legislative power within their 
domain. The notion of party systems can be confusing in regional party research because 
it implicitly refers to party systems at the core state level. Therefore, we have to add that 
regional parties can be included in party systems on both the national and regional levels 
if the region follows those criteria discussed above.
As the magnitude is small in the three regional constituencies, measures had to be taken 
to fit into the national system with minimal exceptions. The population of the Faroe Islands 
was 30,000 in 1948 compared to about 50,000 today; Greenland had a population of 50,000 
in 1979 and about 57,000 today; the population of Åland was about 20,000 in 1921 and is 
about 30,000 today. Parliamentary elections on the national level are organised by the nation 
state, not by the self-ruled regions. In none of the three island regions under discussion 
were national electoral laws an issue. It was more a concern for the national governments to 
minimise the parliament's influence from the islands, as MPs from the islands participate 
in all national decisions whereas MPs from the mainland are excluded from decisions 
written in the act of self-rule. In addition, concerns were met that incumbents from the 
islands could hold the balance of power. The electoral systems are now standardised to 
resemble the system on the mainland. Proportional voting is implemented, though the 
system on the Åland islands is odd as only one incumbent is elected. The Faroe Islands, 
and Greenland have two incumbents each in the Danish parliament. The sole incumbent 
from Åland acts alone among 199 other incumbents representing national parties, and the 
four total incumbents from Faroe Islands and Greenland are in a similar position among 
179 MPs.
Representation in core state parliaments has never been a main issue for the self-
ruled regions. The lack of conflict between the core state governments and the regional 
governments on how seats are distributed in national parliaments indicates its low 
importance in enhancing regional aims. The means of influencing decision-making in 
national parliaments can either be initiated within the house or externally in negotiations 
between national and regional governments. Regional parties with no representation in 
cabinet have a theoretical chance to raise an initiative in parliament, but with the support 
of one or two seats it is an unrealistic option. To ensure a strong regional government a 
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better option is how core state and regional governments come to terms. Party engagement 
in regional assemblies and government increases the more legislative power is devolved 
to the regional government and downgrades the engagement for the core state parliament. 
However, acts are checked before coming into force. Acts are not allowed to be against 
the constitution or violate the legislative competence given to the self-ruled region. Most 
conflicts between the core state and the self-governed region have their origins in different 
interpretations of legality, where the core state usually is in a more advantaged position.     
5.1 Loyal regional agents in national parliaments
Given this meagre representation in these two national parliaments it seems obvious that 
legislation and policy matters for the three regions and good prospects are unlikely to be 
accomplished. Without an entrenched self-rule protected by law these territories would 
be totally exposed to the majority will in the national parliaments. The situation is partly 
different in large self-ruled territories like Catalonia and Scotland. Regional representation 
by national and regional parties is much bigger in the national parliaments and they have 
more to say by using different strategies to fulfil their aims. Still, the entrenched self-rule 
gives them a protection and opens the doors to deepen and enlarge their nationalist identity. 
Common institutions and borders matter in state-making. Nation-building takes place 
when the inhabitants of the state form a community marked by a Gemeinschaft – a feeling 
where members distribute and share benefits (Finer 1975, 85–86). However, territorial 
oppositions and waves of counter mobilization threaten the unity of the nation and set 
limits to nation-building (Rokkan 2009, 46–71). Entrenched self-government includes 
main components of state-making and nation-building which partly differ from the core 
state. Within its realm a regional identity and loyalty to its government and legislation 
can take place. This process is enhanced if the region is well governed and better off than 
the core state. Given that the self-government arrangement is written in the constitution 
or is well anchored in legislation, it effectively protects regional parties and voters from 
eventual core state pressures. 
Protection has its limits in relatively new democracies with less consolidated procedures 
to handle human and civil rights. It works best in established liberal democracies where 
minority rights are protected in the constitution and respected by the legislators. In addition, 
these regional parliaments give regional parties a better platform to act and lead governments, 
which gives visibility and power to negotiate with the core state government. A combination 
of inside activity in the core state parliament and government to government debates should 
be more efficient than relying exclusively on regional parties in national parliaments. 
The Spanish core state government has made things clear. It was exclusively the Catalan 
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parliament which had the disputed formal power to declare independence. Therefore, the 
Catalan president and the government was expelled by the Spanish government, and the 
leading actors were prosecuted by the Supreme Court. Entrenched self-government has a 
coercive role in times of coexistence and conflict with the core state authorities, as it has the 
exclusive authority to institutionalize decisions from diverging views.
Although the one (Åland) or two (Faroe Islands and Greenland) elected incumbents 
from the islands are formally involved in decision making concerning the entire nation, in 
practice they have little to say if they lack collaborating parties. Non-island incumbents in 
national parliament, on the other hand, are excluded from the legislation process devolved 
to the island parliaments. There is no formal hindrance that an incumbent elected from the 
islands could be included in national cabinet, yet it has not happened. A silent agreement 
keeps them out as it could give too much advantage to the self-ruled regions, which is not in 
line with a unitary state. Fears have been raised in Denmark that the four incumbents from 
the two self-ruled regions could utilize their mandate if the two-party blocks in parliament 
are of equal strength.
This seems to be one main informal difference between federal states and our examples 
of self-government arrangements, that is, whether the federal states are asymmetric, or 
even the smallest member states, are not discriminated against when cabinet members 
are recruited. It is the essence of how federal states are organized and political parties 
behave. The unitary core states of Denmark and Finland systematically exclude their self-
ruled regions from the national nucleus of government. National parties recruit cabinet 
members from their own active cadres with the intention to be representative for the entire 
nation. Incumbents representing small parties from self-governed islands are automatically 
excluded. This distinction shows that in practise national government parties consider 
elected incumbents from the self-governed regions as different “nationals” representing 
their partly sovereign interests. 
Although the role of island incumbents in national parliaments can be discussed, they 
fulfil an important mission for their regions. As members of parliament they get up to date 
information about coming and ongoing legislation, budgetary process, and the discussion in 
the house. Most important, the incumbents are kind of gate keepers who alarm the national 
and regional governments when matters concerning the self-ruled region are neglected 
or violated and when proposals from regional governments are not proceeding. Regional 
governments find it important to assist their incumbents by the supporting service of “mini 
island embassies” in the respective capitals of Copenhagen and Helsinki. That would not 
be the case if the role of island incumbents had been neglected or considered superfluous. 
Compared to incumbents from other national constituencies, the island incumbents have 
a more strategic role as they are legislators in the national parliament and simultaneously 
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represent the policy of legislators in the self-ruled island parliaments. Therefore, they 
have been given the role as loyal agents to the regional governments, although the 
governments have no role in the process of nomination and election. Regional parties have 
nominated them, voters have elected them, but they are liable in the first instance to the 
regional government, not to their party or their voters. This is not a contradiction in small 
homogeneous regions insofar as deep internal political conflicts are avoided.  
Legislatures from the Faroe Islands and Greenland have the role of distinct ethnic 
regional parties in the Danish Folketing. They form a parliamentary party of their own, 
usually representing the two largest parties from the two regions separately. The one-
member parliamentary parties are members of the Faroe Islands committee and the 
Greenland committee respectively, together with 27 other members representing the core 
state parties in the Danish Folketing. The sole Åland incumbent is an independent member 
of the Swedish People’s Party parliamentary party, with no formal connection to the party 
organization. So far, this concept has worked, no matter which party the sole incumbent 
represents on the Åland Islands. To join a parliamentary party with a similar party label 
would not work due to deep language and cultural differences.  
5.2 Regional governments with authority
The life of regional parties is essentially different depending on the institutional context. 
In an entrenched self-ruled arrangement sovereignty is devolved from the core state to the 
regional government. This government has the mandate and authority to negotiate with the 
core state government resembling when two independent states negotiate. Parties behind 
the government, whether regional or branches of national parties, may well have different 
policy views, but when decisions are taken the outcome are institutionalized. The process 
of institutionalization gives the regional government authority to act. In regions lacking 
entrenched self-rule, elected authorities are subordinated to the national government. They 
stand weak against central authorities and are dependent of how national resources are 
distributed. Open opposition against national decisions is not the best option to take; it may 
severely harm the region. Regional parties, on the other hand, are better suited to express 
discontent and to mobilize voters to push their aims. Thus, the platform to act is different. 
Regional parties have to manage on their own compared to regional parties in self-ruled 
territories, who can lean on its government and administration. Studies show that it is 
not easy for these parties to manage on their own, and there is no wonder that protest has 
turned to cooperation and compromise.
The development of a distinct regional party system with no organizational links to 
national parties has, as already mentioned, been typical for minorities and distinct language 
26
communities. The pay-off for national parties to compete in core state elections is minimal 
as the regions have maximally two seats in parliament. In addition, language and culture 
raise barriers to overcome. Under such circumstances a regional multi-party system can 
be developed only if the self-ruled territory has internal sovereignty to legislate. Elections 
to these assemblies can be managed without parties, but even in small communities 
cleavages are found which in the long run have been politicized and loosely organized 
to political parties. However, in major issues related to their self-ruled status all three 
regional governments have called for referendums.
Examples of such mobilizations are found in all three self-ruled islands. More than 
the other two, Greenlanders have sought popular support to enhance pressure on the 
core state. An example took place in 1979 as a massive percentage (70.1 percent) voted 
in favour of the establishment of the Greenlandic parliament, including sovereignty in 
areas like education, health, fisheries and the environment. In 1982, the Greenlandic 
government appealed to voters in a referendum whether Greenland should continue to be 
a member of the European Economic Community. A majority was against (53.02 percent) 
continued membership, which had been enforced against their will when Denmark joined 
in 1973, though Greenlanders were opposed at the time. After 30 years of self-rule, a new 
referendum was called for to enlarge Greenlandic sovereignty and to enhance plans for 
a future independence. A vast majority (75.5 percent) supported this referendum, which 
gave the Greenlandic government a strong basis for negotiations with the core state. In all 
three cases the popular will was approved by the Danish government and the EEC. 
An independence referendum was called for in the Faroe Islands in 1946, which won 
a minimal majority (50.7 percent). The Danish government did not accept the result, but 
the Faroe Islands received self-rule as compensation. Two petitions were collected in 1917 
and 1919 on the Åland Islands and handed over to the Swedish government. The petitions 
received massive support among the Ålandic population, who wished to reunite with 
Sweden. A conflict between Åland and Finland and between Finland and Sweden resulted 
in the Åland case being settled by the League of Nations. Åland was compensated with a 
sovereign self-rule against its will. In 1994, a referendum was called for in Åland regarding 
European Union membership. The voter turn-out was only 49.1 percent, but a vast majority 
of 73.6 percent voted in favour of EU membership. To their disappointment Åland was 
denied a seat in the European Parliament and a demand for correction is continuously on 
the agenda with the Finnish government. 
A massive level of support for the regional government policy in a referendum widens 
and deepens the political demand to the core state government, similarly as the Brexit vote 
in the UK opened the gates for secession preparations from the EU. When the support is not 
massive, as in the case of the UK, deep cleavages seems to follow. Regional governments 
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take risks in calling for referendums if they are not ensured that the result will strongly 
support their political aims. Issues related to secession are subject to divide citizens in 
territorial autonomies. Referendum as an instrument to enhance political aims with severe 
impact on legislation is used both in core states and in devolved self-governments.
Although the three self-ruled regions have different histories of party systems, a similar 
cleavage structure is visible. One is between separatism and unionism, and the other 
crossing the line is between left and right. Although the former cleavage fits better to the 
Faroe Islands and Greenland, it can to a certain extent even be applicable to the Åland 
Islands (Hoff and West, 2008: 311–332). The former cleavage distinguishes the self-ruled 
regions from party systems in the core states. The latter cleavage follows the pattern in 
core states. However, the overwhelming cleavage goes between separatism and unionism, 
which either unite or open rifts between people on the islands. The more united the common 
will, the less need for a party system from the outset. The left and right cleavage grows in 
importance when the redistribution of welfare service dominates the budgetary process in 
the regional assemblies. Still, the separatist and unionist cleavages continue to shadow all 
parties from the left to the right.
At the moment between six and eight regional parties contest for mandates in the 
legislative assemblies in the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and on the Åland Islands (see 
Appendix 2). Despite cleavages between the regional parties, personal image make 
sense, and so do kinship and informal networks including place of residence. On the 
individual level conflicts can escalate deeply, but between organized parties conflicts are 
moderate. Regional parties have little to say in relation to the core state. The best option 
is to maximise votes and power in order to be included in the regional government. The 
regional government has the legislative power and the constitutional mandate to pursue its 
aims for the Danish or Finnish governments.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to understand and explain the role of regional parties in 
small self-ruled regions. In contrast to what is explicit or implicitly said, entrenched 
self-government matters, but its impact on regional parties is regulated by the region's 
size and its distinct language/cultural homogeneity. In this paper we have selected the 
smallest, most autonomous, and most culturally distinct island regions to discover 
common knowledge of regional parties. In this setting regional parties have a function in 
regional assembly elections and in regional government. Additionally, regional parties also 
have a function in core state elections. But the main actors are the core state government 
and the regional government in resolving interest of conflicts, which often is a result of 
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diverging interpretations on the division of legislative power. In this context regional party 
incumbents in national parliaments function as agents for the regional government. Due to 
the small size and high homogeneity there is no contradiction between being an agent to 
the regional government or the voters. Their mandate is given by the voters, but it includes 
serving as loyal agents to the regional government, not to their loosely organized party. 
More interesting, however, is the question on what the mechanisms behind the limited 
role of regional parties in core state politics are. We have in this paper operated with two 
background variables: 
1) population size
2) the degree of a homogeneous and distinct language/culture
This is in order to fit the criteria of most similar systems design. The populations are small, 
and culture and language are distinct from their mainland nation states. What differs is the 
introduction and consolidation of the degree of entrenched self-rule. 
The degree of self-rule can take different measures; however, in our cases all three 
regions show a high degree of autonomy. A considerable amount of legislative power is 
devolved to these three regions. Population size gives electoral power, but in our three 
cases size is small and the electoral power in core state elections is restricted. A region 
may be homogeneous or diverse on a scale between those two extremes. In our cases 
homogeneity is in the first instance focused on a distinct language and culture, but also 
on a relatively equal distribution of income. In diverted regions cleavages are deeper and 
party conflicts may take another magnitude. The situation in our study is asymmetric as 
the regional legislative power is strong, the electoral strength is low in core state elections, 
and regional party conflicts are low or moderate. However, regions with strong electoral 
power and low homogeneity easily give birth to disagreement on the degree of self-rule 
or even independence. Regional parties which act in an environment without de jure 
self-government with legislative power are in a different situation. They lack a regional 
assembly with the right to legislate, and one which is partially protected from the core state 
authority. Instead, they have to overcome the thresholds to be represented in the core state 
legislative parliament, and a separate party system is by definition unheard of. In our three 
cases regional parties paid none or a minor role in the introduction of self-government. It 
was a result of international events and pressures that gave birth to these self-governing 
territories.
However, high degrees of homogeneity and very small population sizes make regional 
parties in national parliaments agents of their own regional governments, which in fact 
maximises the regional influence on decisions made in the national parliament. It would 
be a mistake to dismiss our three extreme cases to a residual category of exceptions. In 
contrast, the choice has been made to elaborate more evident arguments. First, will the 
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role of regional parties increase when the degree of autonomy is low? Second, what is the 
linkage between regional parties, including national parties with mandates from a large 
multicultural region and the regional government in the national parliament? Third, to what 
extent are regional party and national party incumbents agents of the regional government 
in the first instance, and their party organization in the second instance? Fourth, who are 
the main actors in pursuing regional demands to the core state government: the regional 
government, regional parties, or core state parties? These questions and comments open up 
a more systematic and comparative approach for future endeavours in the field of regional 
party research. Finally, to what extent is entrenched self-government similarly relevant in 
other forms of autonomous arrangements?
__________
i Secession of Iceland in 1944 and the risk of secession of the Faroe Islands in 1946.
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Appendix 1
Voter turnout: Nationwide compared to island votes
Source: IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance), http://www.idea.int/vt/
countryview.cfm?id=74; http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=63 (accessed 14 August 
2015); Folketingsvalg på Færøerne siden 1953, http://www.ft.dk/Folketinget/Oplysningen/Valg/
Valgresultater_Faeroerne.aspx (accessed 14 August 2015); Folketingsvalg i Grønland siden 
1977, http://www.ft.dk/Folketinget/Oplysningen/Valg/Valgresultat_Groenland.aspx (accessed 
14 August 2015); ÅSUB, http://www.asub.ax/text.con?iPage=261; http://www.asub.ax/files/
riksdagsval_2015.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015); ÅSUB, http://pxweb.asub.ax/PXWeb/pxweb/
sv/Statistik/Statistik__VA/VA008.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=b911eedb-3596-4162-
bb57-8f5ab57afbfc (accessed 16 August 2015). *Straw voting; **Straw voting in the number 2 
constituency; *** Straw voting in the number 1 constituency.
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Appendix 2
Table 1: Overview of the Faroese party system with 
electoral results 1945–1990 (in percentages)
Table 2: Overview of the Faroese party system with 
electoral results 1994–2015 (in percentages)
Source: Statistics Faroe Islands; available at www.hagstova.fo/en 
1 In December 2007 the proportional electoral system was changed from a system of 7 
constituencies to only consist of one constituency.
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Table 3: Overview of the Greenlandic party system with 
electoral results from 1979–2014 (in percentages)
Sources: Maria Ackrén (2014), Table 1 and 2, pp. 176–177; Maria Ackrén (2015), Table 3, p. 332.
https://www.valg.gl 
Table 4: Overview of the Ålandic party system with 
electoral results 1971–2015 (in percentages)
Sources: Ålands statistik- och utredningsbyrå (ÅSUB): Available at http://www.asub.ax/
statistic_detail.con?iPage=45&m=76&sub=2; Peter Söderlund (2008), p. 132. 
